Free checklist

10 security holes AI leaves in your app

AI builders get you to a working demo, not a safe one. These are the ten checks BellerBuild actually runs on an AI-built app, in plain English, with the exact fix for each. Eight are ways data leaks, one is a supply-chain smell, and one is a sign the access rules were never finished. We say which is which — a scan that cries wolf trains you to ignore it.

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  1. 1 Row Level Security was never turned on critical · RLS-001

    The table exists, but enable row level security never ran. With the public anon key, the Supabase API serves every row in that table to anyone who asks.

    Fix: alter table public.your_table enable row level security; then add a policy that scopes rows to the signed-in user.

  2. 2 A policy that allows everyone critical · RLS-025

    A policy whose condition is always true (using (true)). Depending on the command, anyone can read, change, or delete every row.

    Fix: replace the condition with a real ownership check, e.g. using (auth.uid() = user_id).

  3. 3 A write policy with no WITH CHECK high · RLS-010

    An INSERT or UPDATE policy constrains what a user can see, not what they can write. New rows can be pointed at someone else's account.

    Fix: add with check (auth.uid() = user_id) to the write policy.

  4. 4 RLS is on but never forced medium · RLS-054

    Without FORCE, the table owner and some service paths bypass the policies. The rules you wrote do not apply to every connection.

    Fix: alter table public.your_table force row level security; for each table.

  5. 5 The service_role key shipped to the client critical · SEC-002

    The service_role key ignores every Row Level Security policy. In a browser bundle or a public repo, anyone can read and change all your data as an admin.

    Fix: keep it server-side only, move it to an environment variable, and rotate it if it was ever exposed.

  6. 6 A private key committed to the repo critical · SEC-003

    A -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- block in the tree lets anyone impersonate the service it protects.

    Fix: remove it from the repo, rotate it, and load it from an environment variable or secret manager at deploy time.

  7. 7 A password or API key hardcoded in source high · SEC-001

    An inline credential ends up in git history forever, even after you delete the line.

    Fix: move it to an environment variable or secret manager and rotate it.

  8. 8 A dependency with a known vulnerability varies · DEP-001

    A pinned package version matches a published advisory. The app works, but the hole is documented and scripted.

    Fix: upgrade to a patched version and re-lock the dependency.

  9. 9 An import no manifest declares supply chain · DEP-002

    Not a leak: a file imports a package your manifest never declares. It builds on your machine and breaks — or pulls something unexpected — somewhere else.

    Fix: declare the dependency and lock it.

  10. 10 RLS on, zero policies, but the app reads the table completeness · RLS-002

    Not a leak either: RLS with no policies denies everyone. It usually means a policy was forgotten and the work was never finished.

    Fix: if the app should read the table, add the read policy; if it is server-only, no action is needed.

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