10 security holes AI leaves in your app
AI builders get you to a working demo, not a safe one. These are the ten checks BellerBuild actually runs on an AI-built app, in plain English, with the exact fix for each. Eight are ways data leaks, one is a supply-chain smell, and one is a sign the access rules were never finished. We say which is which — a scan that cries wolf trains you to ignore it.
Read-only. Nothing here needs your database password. The free scan uploads your migrations and source, checks them, and discards the upload right after.
Download it as a file you can print or share, and get occasional BellerBuild security updates. No spam; unsubscribe anytime.
Used only for the checklist and BellerBuild updates. See the privacy policy.
-
1 Row Level Security was never turned on critical · RLS-001
The table exists, but
enable row level securitynever ran. With the public anon key, the Supabase API serves every row in that table to anyone who asks.Fix:
alter table public.your_table enable row level security;then add a policy that scopes rows to the signed-in user. -
2 A policy that allows everyone critical · RLS-025
A policy whose condition is always true (
using (true)). Depending on the command, anyone can read, change, or delete every row.Fix: replace the condition with a real ownership check, e.g.
using (auth.uid() = user_id). -
3 A write policy with no WITH CHECK high · RLS-010
An INSERT or UPDATE policy constrains what a user can see, not what they can write. New rows can be pointed at someone else's account.
Fix: add
with check (auth.uid() = user_id)to the write policy. -
4 RLS is on but never forced medium · RLS-054
Without FORCE, the table owner and some service paths bypass the policies. The rules you wrote do not apply to every connection.
Fix:
alter table public.your_table force row level security;for each table. -
5 The service_role key shipped to the client critical · SEC-002
The service_role key ignores every Row Level Security policy. In a browser bundle or a public repo, anyone can read and change all your data as an admin.
Fix: keep it server-side only, move it to an environment variable, and rotate it if it was ever exposed.
-
6 A private key committed to the repo critical · SEC-003
A
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----block in the tree lets anyone impersonate the service it protects.Fix: remove it from the repo, rotate it, and load it from an environment variable or secret manager at deploy time.
-
7 A password or API key hardcoded in source high · SEC-001
An inline credential ends up in git history forever, even after you delete the line.
Fix: move it to an environment variable or secret manager and rotate it.
-
8 A dependency with a known vulnerability varies · DEP-001
A pinned package version matches a published advisory. The app works, but the hole is documented and scripted.
Fix: upgrade to a patched version and re-lock the dependency.
-
9 An import no manifest declares supply chain · DEP-002
Not a leak: a file imports a package your manifest never declares. It builds on your machine and breaks — or pulls something unexpected — somewhere else.
Fix: declare the dependency and lock it.
-
10 RLS on, zero policies, but the app reads the table completeness · RLS-002
Not a leak either: RLS with no policies denies everyone. It usually means a policy was forgotten and the work was never finished.
Fix: if the app should read the table, add the read policy; if it is server-only, no action is needed.
Free, read-only, plain English, with the fix for anything it finds.